The author would like to point out that the below two quotes were incorrectly attributed to Pritchard. Both quotes are in fact from Orestis Palermos.
This sense of epistemically adequate-yet unreflective-cognitive responsibility can only be achieved by agents like us, whose intellectual capacities are appropriately interconnected such that in cases where there is something wrong with the way we form our beliefs or with the beliefs themselves, we will be able to notice this and respond appropriately. Otherwise-if there is nothing wrongwe can go on about with our daily activities without questioning our epistemic standing with respect to every single of the millions (possibly billions?) of beliefs we enjoy in the course of our days (Palermos 2014 (Palermos , p. 1934 ).
While it is true that in order to know we do need the way of forming our beliefs to be objectively reliable, this sort of objective justification is not sufficient in its own. What we further need is that we be subjectively justified in the sense that we must be somehow sensitive to the reliability of our evidence. Process reliabilism, however, ignores this dimension of our epistemically sentient nature altogether (Palermos 2014 (Palermos , p. 1936 .
The online version of the original article can be found under doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0719-z.
B Andy Clark andy.clark@ed.ac.uk
